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Development geography 1: Cooperation, competition and convergence 
between 'North' and 'South' 
 
Abstract 
 
In this report I examine two of the most important trends bearing down on the 
international development regime in 2015, a landmark year. The first is the 
consolidation of South-South development cooperation (acknowledging the 
problematic nature of this designation), materially, ontologically and ideationally. 
The second is the response of the (so-called) 'traditional' donors to the 
opportunities and challenges provided by the 'rise of the South', in the context of 
the uneven reverberations of the post-2007/8 global financial crisis. Together, 
these interpolated trends have contributed to an unprecedented rupture in the 
North-South axis that has dominated post-1945 international development norms 
and structures - an axis that has also provided the focus for radical and critical 
approaches to the geographies of development. The resulting development 
landscape is complex and turbulent, bringing stimulating challenges to theorists 
of aid and development. 
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Introduction 
Since its inception, the Western-dominated international development regime has 
been subject to epochal shifts in geopolitical logic and capitalist ideology (Hart 
2009). A more stable feature of the dominant regime, however, has been the 
normative projection of a global d/Development axis, which has consistently 
produced the 'South' as the disciplinary subject, and the 'North' as active and 
benevolent provider of knowledge and material assistance (Kothari 2005; Kapoor 
2008; Esteves and Assunção 2014). This framing obscures (with greater or lesser 
success) the intense counter/cross-flows and intertwining of peoples, ideas and 
materials (Silvey 2010). Recent claims to 'partnership' of various sorts have only 
very partially ameliorated the tenacious material and discursive hierarchies of 
donor and recipient (Hyden 2008; Eyben 2013a).  
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The last decade or so, however, has witnessed an unprecedented upsetting of this 
normative hierarchy (Chin and Quadir 2012; Mawdsley 2012). We should not 
overstate this: the 'traditional donors' continue to wield substantial power. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the non-DAC actors are profoundly unsettling long-
standing axes of power. Strikingly, this rupture is revealed as much by the current 
efforts of many DAC donors and international institutions to collaborate, co-learn 
and partner with Southern actors, as it is by competitive or hostile commentaries 
and stances (Li and Carey 2014).  
 
The 'rise of the South' and fractured hegemony 
Geographers have been at the forefront of efforts to expose the imperial DNA of 
modern development. The tropes and practices of international development 
have been forensically examined to reveal the work they perform in producing 
and sustaining regimes of extraction, accumulation and pacification (Ballard 
2013); and the global imaginaries that act to normalise these processes and 
hierarchies (Dogra 2012). The critical contestation of colonial and post-colonial 
North-South inequalities and development hegemonies remains a vital task for 
scholars (McEwan 2009; Radcliffe 2015). But in one of the most interesting and 
important trends confronting geographers in the last decade, this classic axis is 
being re-oriented. Global and national landscapes of wealth, poverty and 
(in)equality have changed substantially (Kanbur and Sumner 2012; Rigg 2012; 
Sidaway 2012), with a number of countries 'graduating' to official calculations of 
'middle income' status, while sometimes continuing to have significant shares of 
the population living in grinding poverty and/or enduring vulnerability. At the 
same time, growing economic vitality in the South has enabled many traditional 
recipients to reduce their dependence on aid (Janus et al 2014). 
 
It is now widely recognised that many Southern providers are not 'new' or 
'emerging' as development partners, having often been engaged in various forms 
of assistance for decades. Like their DAC peers, they too are motivated by the 
pursuit of geo-economic interests and soft power, but as (former) socialist, Third 
World and Arab states, they were and are positioned differently within regional 
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and global power structures; are shaped by different domestic agendas and 
capacities; and their development assistance is framed by very different geo-
cultural scripts of giving and receiving (Bayley 2009). China still dominates 
research and commentary (e.g. Mohan 2014), but the field has matured as 
researchers have extended their gaze not just to the other BRICS, individually and 
collectively (e.g. Chaturvedi et al 2012), but to the 'second tier' of MINTs and 
CIVETS1 (Schulz 2010), taking in Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico, amongst many 
others. Analysts are also turning to less well-known development partners, such 
as Azerbaijan, Khazakstan and Thailand (Cordier 2014; Sato 2007), and to much 
smaller and often more sporadic donors, who may nonetheless punch above their 
weight in terms of soft power or generosity. Smith (2011), for example, calculates 
that amongst the top ten humanitarian donors to the Haiti Emergency Response 
Fund after the 2010 earthquake were Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Tunisia 
and the Republic of Congo. We can also observe a nascent but growing research 
interest in the role of and implications for civil society in more formal South-
South development assistance (Tomlinson 2013; Vaes and Huyse 2013; Poskitt et 
al 2015), the private sector (e.g. Gu 2009), and in 'ordinary people', such as 
migrants and small-scale business people (Mohan et al 2014). More specialist 
work is also emerging, with growing research into particular sectors, such as 
security, health or agriculture; on particular bilateral relationships; and on the 
views and experiences of various recipients/partners (e.g. Greenhill et al 2013; 
Abdenur and Marcondes-Neto 2014; Adhikari 2014).  
 
One way to unpack the fracturing of the hegemonic development regime is to 
think through a tripartite framework of material, ideational and ontological. The 
'material' refers to the quantum of 'aid' and 'aid-like' flows of finances (grants, 
different forms of loans and concessional financing instruments), goods (e.g. food 
aid) and technical assistance (e.g. consultancy, training, educational scholarships, 
medical personnel, agricultural extension). For many non-DAC partners, 
development cooperation merges with humanitarian assistance (a much criticised 
distinction that continues to be made by western donors), and is often blended 
                                                        
1 CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa); MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Turkey). 
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with commercial investment, trade and finance, rendering some elements illegible 
to the calculative tools of the mainstream aid community. For a variety of reasons 
then, estimates of the financial and in-kind assistance provided by non-DAC 
partners vary widely, and are open to considerable misunderstanding and 
misreporting (Bräutigam 2011; see recent initiatives by AidData).2 However, the 
headline trend is clear, and that is the absolute and relative increase of bilateral 
and multilateral contributions from the non-DAC development partners 
(Zimmerman and Smith 2011). Depending on definitions, most reliable estimates 
suggest that non-DAC 'aid' and 'aid-like' flows have increased from around 5% of 
the global ODA/ODA-like share in the late 1990s (although it should be said that 
this represented a historic low), to around 15-20% at present (UNDP 2013). 
Although still far below DAC levels, dollar for dollar many Southern development 
partners are able to leverage more impact than their Western counterparts. Loans 
are often tied to the purchase of donor goods and services, but these usually come 
more cheaply than DAC equivalents, producing better value for money. Second, 
the blended nature of many development assistance packages can make them 
very attractive to recipients - technical assistance and 'aid-like' loans may be 
accompanied by a commercial financing arrangement and a trade agreement, for 
example. Much of the buzz around the New Development Bank (earlier called the 
BRICS Bank) and now the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
is to what extent they will have the capacity or be intended to act as a competitor 
to the IFIs (Abdenur 2014).  
 
The second element of the framework proposed above is ontological. By this I 
mean the profound re-making of (inter)national identity that has accompanied 
the achievement of global recognition and respect for Southern states in their role 
as development partners over the last decade or so. The speed with which this 
has happened is remarkable. Until quite recently, many within the 'traditional' 
development regime (including western medias, publics, academia and think 
tanks) had overlooked or in some cases been dismissive of South-South 
                                                        
2 http://aiddata.org/ 
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development cooperation.3 This started to change in the early new millennium, 
and following the growing visibility and activity of China in particular, a trickle of 
awareness and analysis rapidly turned into a flood. There were plenty of critics: 
some thoroughly alarmist (e.g. Hitchins 2008), as well as less absurd but still 
invidious discourses of heroes, villains and dupes. More formal commentators like 
Moises Naim (2007) who wrote about 'rogue donors' supplying 'toxic aid' 
reflected not uncommon concerns, although rarely as quotably. Most mainstream 
analysts, however, publicly offered more considered responses, which recognised 
opportunities and legitimacy as well as potential problems (e.g. Manning 2006). 
Even so, to different extents, many implicitly assumed or explicitly stated that the 
role of the OECD-DAC and its members would be to 'socialise' the rising powers. 
Conferences, outreach programmes, study groups and invitations to participate in 
donor meetings and forums were expected by many to act as the venues and 
vectors by which the Southern partners would learn from and adopt western 
'best practice' and superior experience. But by the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, held in Busan, Korea, it was the OECD-DAC donors who were doing 
the running in trying to persuade Brazil, India and above all, China, to come to the 
table; and who were willing to make very considerable concessions to ensure the 
semblance of a global agreement (Eyben and Savage 2013; Abdel-Malek 2015). 
The politics of this event were complex (and by no means pivoted on a 'North-
South' axis alone), but the voluntary nature and policy leeway expressed in the 
Busan Outcome Document clearly demonstrates the ability of the Southern 
partners to resist those traditional donors who sought to bind them to shared 
obligations and targets.  
 
Current approaches amongst individual 'mainstream' development actors vary. 
Some seem to warmly embrace the possibilities of co-learning and cooperation, 
                                                        
3 There are, of course, very notable exceptions, and quite a substantial literature on South-South 
development cooperation within Area Studies, History and International Relations. But as far as I 
can tell, there was relatively little research or theorising South-South development cooperation 
within development Geography (although this may reflect my own lack of awareness, and I would 
be happy to be proved wrong). Baker and Edmonds (2004) provide one earlier example than 
most.  
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viewing Southern partners not just as providers of additional resources but also 
complementary knowledge, ideas and experience (Shankland and Constantine 
2014). However there is also evidence of resistance, or at least attempts to slow 
the transition down (Eyben 2013b). Vestergaard and Wade (2014), for example, 
demonstrate how the apparent re-balancing of voting rights in the IMF towards 
greater Southern representation in fact reflects a concerted retention of power by 
the traditional powers; while Abdenur and Da Fonseca (2013) trace in the suite of 
initiatives for cooperation and collaboration between Northern and Southern 
partners, an agenda to domesticate these emerging rivals.   
 
From these (inevitably) mixed signals, we can discern at least one shared point, 
namely that over the short space of a decade or so, South-South development 
cooperation - and more unevenly, different Southern partners - have acquired 
genuine recognition and (more variably) respect, from the 'traditional' donors. 
Their status as providers and not just recipients, as necessary and legitimate 
contributors to global development governance, ideas and resources, and indeed 
as rivals in the same fields, is now universally acknowledged. Eyben (2013b) 
charts the move from 'closed spaces' to 'invited spaces' as one indicator of power 
shift, to which we could add 'declined spaces': some Southern partners are 
uninterested in gracing particular meetings with their presence, and such is their 
new necessity that this can undermine the credibility of the event in question (as 
with the 2014 Global Partnership meeting in Mexico). The OECD-DAC and 
individual members remain attractive partners for various collaborations and 
ventures, but Southern states are increasingly selecting which ones and on whose 
terms. At the same time, although relationships are by no means always straight 
forward or uncontested, recipient/partner countries have generally welcomed 
Southern development partners, comparing them favourably in some regards to 
their western donors (Large and Patey 2011; Mohan and Lampert 2013). In sum, 
the development imaginaries that once discursively overlooked and diminished 
Southern states as providers of development assistance can no longer be 
sustained. The ontological hierarchy of Northern donors and Southern recipients 
has been profoundly upset.  
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The third part of this interlocking framework is the ideational. This refers to the 
discursive construction and projection of development 'norms', such as those 
concerning modalities, priority sectors, languages of partnership and so on. One 
reading of current trends amongst the OECD-DAC donors is that they are moving 
towards Southern development norms and modalities. Provocatively, we could 
say it is the Southern states that have over the last few years more successfully 
projected ideational power in international development. A more structural 
interpretation, however, would suggest that transnational economic and political 
elites of all hues are finding areas of alignment and mutual interest in driving 
capital extraction and accumulation ever more deeply and unevenly (Hart 2009), 
and the development policies and financial instruments of many Northern and 
Southern partners are - in part - being harnessed to this end (Rowden 2011; 
Curtis 2013; Kragelund 2015).  
 
To understand this ideational shift, and potential convergence around it, we need 
to look back to the mid/late 1990s. Hulme and Fukuda-Parr (2009) suggest that 
at this time, a particular confluence of actors, events and ideas created a policy 
window, through which emerged the MDGs. For the first time in international 
development, poverty reduction became the central principle around which other 
supporting objectives – economic growth, good governance, social welfare, 
sustainable development, security, gender empowerment, and inclusive finance - 
were (supposedly) organised. This was accompanied by a programmatic focus on 
the 'soft wiring' of development. Economic growth was certainly on the agenda, 
but subordinate in official aid discourses, policies and spending to poverty 
reduction goals, albeit framed by neoliberal principles of individual 
entrepreneurship (Roy 2010). In the last few years, however, it appears that 
poverty reduction is being de-centred by the return of economic growth as the 
central analytic of 'development'. Donors are still talking about poverty reduction, 
and for that matter, about health, education, gender, governance and even 
inequality, but the focus on how to achieve these is being increasingly insistently 
presented as 'growth', amongst DAC and non-DAC states alike.  
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This ideational shift is the result of the interplay between different trends, events 
and actors. The material, ideational and ontological challenge of the non-DAC 
partners has coincided with the impacts of the 'global' and Eurozone financial 
crises in many donor countries, leading to mounting public and political pressure 
to reduce or redefine foreign aid. While South-South assistance includes 
humanitarian provision and technical cooperation in education, health and 
welfare, most Southern donors have tended to prioritise building energy and 
transport infrastructure, supporting agricultural modernisation, and enhancing 
primary and secondary production (e.g. Modi and Cheru 2013). These 
interventions have brought dislocation and violence, extraction and exploitation - 
but they have also brought roads, electricity, jobs and cheap goods. For many 
ordinary people in poorer countries they have helped fan hopes of 'modern 
futures', as well as fears and resentment (Carmody 2009). For political and 
economic elites, they have often brought expanded opportunities for legal and 
illicit profits, and political entrenchment (Soares de Oliveira 2015). For 
'traditional' trade partners, investors and development donors they represent 
opportunities (infrastructure development and rising consumer power can 
benefit all) as well as competition for contracts, resource access, market share 
and political influence. Overall, though, it is a model that looks increasingly 
attractive to Western governments, keen to ensure their hold in frontier and 
emerging markets (Carmody 2011).   
  
DAC donors are increasingly insistent that the private sector must be become a 
major partner and vector of growth-led development (Tomlinson 2012; Di Bella 
et al 2013; Blowfield and Dolan 2014). They are encouraging a more substantial 
role for firms, investment and trade with expanding and newly legitimised 
modalities of developing financing that move 'beyond aid' (Severino and Ray 
2009; Griffiths 2013; Janus et al 2014). A number of governments (in Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the UK, for example) have re-structured their 
international development agencies, sometimes reabsorbing them into Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs/Trade. This is accompanied by an explicit insistence on the 
pursuit of national interests through aid contributions and programmes, 
accompanied by re-formulated discourses of virtue, doing good and 'smart aid' 
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(Banks et al 2011; Parfitt et al 2012; Reilly-King 2012; Van der Poel 2012; 
Mawdsley 2015). 
 
While there is much to welcome in the 'beyond aid' agenda (Barder and Talbot 
2014), the ways in which it is being implemented, by whom, and in who's primary 
interests, is raising concerns. The available evidence suggests that inadequate 
attention is being paid to the connective fabric between such 'growth' and 
'development', in terms of how these are conceptualised, programmed into 
initiatives, monitored and enforced (Kwakkenbos 2012; CDPE 2013; Eurodad 
2013). Although donors talk in various ways about 'inclusive growth', patient 
capital, impact investing and supporting partner country firms, including Small 
and Medium Enterprises, critical analysts find policies and programmes that are 
overwhelmingly acting to support donor firms, and most evidently corporations, 
consultancies and financial firms. Parallel critiques may be leveled at many 
Southern development partners, which often ground their support for 
investment, infrastructure and (agro-)industrial growth in simplistic assertions of 
'win-win' that pay little or no attention to conflicts of interest, displacement, 
labour terms and conditions or sustainability (Rowden 2011).  
 
Conclusions 
The last decade has witnessed a paradigmatic shift that both upsets and 
transcends the old hierarchies of 'North' and 'South'. This has not simply been a 
redistribution of ('Development') power from the 'North' to the 'South'. Rather, in 
what Overton and Murray (2014) refer to as the rise of 'retroliberalism', fusing 
elements of mercantilism, state-led industrialisation and neoliberalism, Southern 
and Northern partners are competing and collaborating but also converging on a 
more open agenda of subsidised support for private sector growth (and State 
Owned Enterprises) in the name of 'development'. Within the international 
development community, poverty reduction, health, education and good 
governance will remain prominent concerns and goals, and are increasingly being 
joined by the idea of 'global public goods' under the SDGs, but they are being re-
sequenced within a powerfully reinvigorated insistence that (publicly subsidised) 
private sector-led economic growth is the key engine of development.  
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In some ways this exhumes much that is associated with modernisation theories 
of the 1950s and 1960s: the conflation of GDP with development, the focus on 
energy and transport infrastructures, agro-industrial productivity, resource 
extraction, and for some, an optimistic sense of forward momentum. If and where 
it provides a foundation for a broad-based improvement in economies, livelihoods 
and standards of living, it will be widely welcomed. But it also raises the spectre 
of accelerated accumulation by dispossession, in which the 'virtuous' claims of 
DAC donors and Southern partners simply provide slightly different 'moral' 
narratives around the creative destruction of 'development'.  Other theorists are 
reviving neo-dependency theories, examining whether poor countries will find 
themselves further locked into an ultimately unprofitable global division of 
extraction and production, but with an expanded 'core' that now includes China, 
India and other Southern powers. In both cases, however, there are important 
differences with earlier eras, including the different articulation of power 
between states, firms and markets in a neoliberal era; the prominence of financial 
firms and interests rather than more traditional profit-seeking enterprises; and 
the complexity of actors. Finally we note that analysts reflexively deploying more 
critical theories to explore South-South cooperation - postcolonialism, feminist 
theory, critical race theory, queer theory and so on - as yet remain rare. They 
include Six (2009), on 'postcolonial' donors; and a collection edited by Amar 
(2012) on how emergent powers in the global south are transforming and 
deploying distinct internationalist security and militarized humanitarian 
development models. The contributors to this volume examine the identities and 
subjectivities of peacekeeping troops and other public and private security 
personnel, as well as their insertion into global hierarchies of labour, race, and 
postcolonial identities.  
 
The SDG negotiations and final outputs reflect an international development 
regime that is more pluralised than ever before. The 'rise of the South' (UNDP 
2013) as well as other non-DAC development partners has driven a genuine re-
balancing - if a partial and still resisted one - in the international development 
architecture, development financing approaches and actors, and in shifting 
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paradigms of aid, development and partnerships (Power 2015). Critical 
development geographers have long wished this moment, and despite the 
cautious - even pessimistic - tone of much of this report, there is unquestionably 
much to celebrate. However, notwithstanding more progressive outcomes and 
possibilities, there appears to be growing ideological convergence around the use 
of 'development' finances and activities to support national geo-economic 
interests, centred on resource extraction, market making, and ensuring investor 
profits. This is hardly new in international development, but at the present 
juncture it is being revived across a novel confluence of actors and contexts, with 
complex implications for wealth creation, poverty reduction, (in)equality and 
development are complex. The formal realm of International Development is 
being 'provincialised', as western hegemony - material, ontological and ideational 
- is at last being eroded. Critical development geographers are and should be at 
the forefront of theorising the 'post-2015' era. 
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